This essay explores competing claims on dignity in transnational debates over abortion and same-sex marriage. To do so, the essay revisits debates about abortion in the 1970s and the first constitutional litigation on abortion these debates prompted. It shows how competing claims on dignity came to shape prominent judicial decisions concerning abortion in Germany and the United States. The essay concludes by demonstrating that this struggle over dignity has begun to spread to the same-sex marriage debates.
in the importance of dignity claims in human rights law unites agonists who otherwise act from fundamentally different beliefs about law's role in regulating sexuality. 1 In an important article entitled Human Dignity and the Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 2 Christopher McCrudden has offered a legal realist account of how "dignity" functions in human rights adjudication. McCrudden argues that dignity:
does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. . . . Dignity provides a convenient cover for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees that appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances….."Dignity's" primary beneficial function in human rights adjudication lies in its importance to legal process, rather than its philosophical substance.
3
McCrudden offers a court-centered institutional and professional account of dignity's authority: dignity meets needs of judiciary negotiating tensions of globalization.
The account of dignity this essay offers differs. However dignity may function in other areas, in debates over the regulation of sexuality, claims on dignity (1) are popular, as well as professional;
(2) are asserted outside as well as inside courts; and (3) are carried across borders, by transnational social movements and religious organizations that (4) deploy dignity in regular and intelligible ways.
Over the decades, these transnational processes seem to have accelerated, as courts have played an increasing role in reviewing laws regulating sexuality and as advocates have become more selfconscious about the logic and stakes of the conflict.
I. Introduction: Appeals to Dignity in the Era of Abortion's Constitutionalization
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, calls for the decriminalization of abortion from emerging feminist movements accelerated in the United States and Europe. Feminist movements were by no means the sole impetus for reform, but feminist claims dramatically altered the stakes and tenor of conversation about abortion. 4 Amidst this growing transnational conversation, courts in the United
States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Italy began for the first time to review the constitutionality of abortion laws. 5 constitutionalization to demonstrate how citizens and judges of very different views increasingly came to make claims on dignity of a kind that had never been associated with abortion before.
In the late nineteenth century, abortion was banned throughout the United States. By the 1960s, calls grew for legislative reform that would allow abortion for public health reasons. Friedan was also speaking as part of a transnational feminist movement. By the early 1970s, women in a number of countries were calling for an end to restrictive national abortion laws 13 using "speak-out" strategies of dissent, including "self-incrimination" 14 campaigns in which women "outed" themselves as having had abortions, and so exposed themselves to criminal prosecution. By telling their abortion stories, despite threat of sanction, women performatively asserted their dignity-a strategy the gay rights movement would soon employ to challenge "the closet."
In France, 343 women drew international attention by declaring that they had had abortions in a 
II. Constitutional Claims on Dignity in Early Abortion Cases
Today, appeals to dignity are common in constitutional jurisprudence concerning abortion. 21 I consider how this discursive practice began in the first constitutional cases on abortion, focusing on the American and German cases because of their prominence in modeling constitutional frameworks governing the regulation of abortion.
Claims on dignity entered this new body of constitutional case law in stages. The first major constitutional cases on abortion appeared in the United States, 22 initially making no express reference to dignity. In the United States, movements seeking to liberalize or decriminalize abortion on grounds of public health, environmentalist concern about overpopulation of the planet, and sexual freedom were joined by feminists seeking to give women choice in matters of sex and motherhood-and together they achieved legislative reform in many states. 23 By the early 1970s, the feminist movement was not only advocating legislative reform; movement lawyers filed numerous suits challenging the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. 24 In West Germany, movements seeking the decriminalization of abortion won an even more decisive victory, but the German Constitutional Court interpreted the Basic Law to prohibit the new legislation-expressly repudiating the dignity claims of the German women's movement.
For much of the twentieth century, paragraph 218 of the German Civil Code banned abortion without exception, although in practice judges regularly read into the statute an exception to save a woman's life/health. 30 In the 1970s, organizing "hundreds of political actions-from street theatre and mass demonstrations to speak-out 'tribunals' and openly publicized bus trips to abortion clinics in the Netherlands," feminists succeeded in eliciting widespread public support for reform. 31 Reformers joined the cause for a variety of reasons, but feminist claims remained audible throughout. As the West German Parliament was considering liberalizing the abortion law, the New York Times reported that 26 GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL supra note 6, at 256-58. 27 See Siegel, supra note 4, at 12 (analyzing the ways Roe responds to, and effaces, feminist abortion rights claims of the era). The German Constitutional Court ruled that the new law, which decriminalized abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy for women provided abortion-dissuasive counseling, violated the dignity of human life. 41 The court justified its decision on the grounds that life was "the living foundation of human dignity and the prerequisite for all other fundamental rights."
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The court expressly and rather brusquely dismissed the Parliament's efforts to devise a framework that respected the dignity of women and of the unborn: "The opinion expressed in the Federal Parliament during the third deliberation on the Statute to Reform of the Penal Law, the effect of which is to propose the precedence for a particular time 'of the right to self-determination of the woman which flows from human dignity vis-à-vis all others, including the child's right to life'], is not reconcilable with the value ordering of the Basic Law." 43 In the court's estimation, the fetus was included in the definition of "human life," and "[w]here human life exists, human dignity is present to it; it is not decisive that the bearer of this dignity himself be conscious of it or know personally how to preserve it. The potential faculties present in the human being form the beginning suffice to establish 39 protect" prenatal life, "entrusted by nature in the first place to the protection of the mother. 46 The Court ruled that women were subject to this duty to carry a pregnancy to term, imposed by "nature" and law, except where the burdens exceeded those "normally" 47 associated with pregnancy. An exception was required where pregnancy posed a threat to the woman's life, and the Court gave the legislature discretion to exempt women from the duty of pregnancy in other extraordinary circumstances, as well.
48
This expressly gendered justification for the first German abortion decision has drawn less attention than the collective memory justification the court offered in concluding the decision.
Famously, the German court justified its interpretation of the Basic Law as requiring Parliament to recriminalize abortion on the grounds that criminalizing abortion repudiated Germany's Nazi past:
Underlying the Basic Law are principles for the structuring of the state that may be understood only in light of the historical experience of the spiritual-moral confrontation with the previous system of National Socialism. In opposition to the omnipotence of the totalitarian state which claimed for itself limitless dominion over all states of social life and which, in the prosecution of its goals of state, consideration for the life of the individual fundamentally meant nothing, the 
III. Competing Conceptions of Dignity in the Abortion Cases
The abortion conflict involves more than a story about two rights holders with conflicting claims on dignity. As early debates over abortion illustrate, there are also competing conceptions of dignity at play, which I have elsewhere termed: dignity as liberty, dignity as equality, dignity as life.
61
Dignity as liberty entails claims on autonomy, on privacy, and on free development of personality. By contrast, dignity as equality involves claims about status, honor, respect, and recognition. Dignity as life appeals to something prior to these forms of social relations, seeking through the regulation of birth, sex, or death to give symbolic expression to the value of human life itself. The German Court interpreted the nation's post-war constitution to prohibit the decriminalization of abortion by reading the Basic Law's guarantee of dignity in this symbolic register, as requiring government efforts to protect life and to affirm its value. The women of Aktion 218 advanced, in part, a dignity claim of this kind; they argued that laws criminalizing abortion threatened women's lives, a claim to which the 1975 decision in part responded. 62 But German women sought more: they appealed to dignity as liberty and equality, seeking freedom to decide whether to continue a pregnancy and recognition of their authority and competence to make decisions about sex, health, parenting, partners, and life plans.
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In ruling that the Basic Law's protections for dignity required the criminalization of abortion, the German Constitutional Court expressly rejected dignity claims of the kind that the women of Aktion 218 had been asserting. 64 Instead, the Court ruled that the state must act to "[t]o reawaken and, if required, to strengthen the maternal duty to protect" prenatal life, unless continuing a pregnancy would impose extraordinary burdens on a woman. 65 The German Court based its interpretation of dignity, not only on a contested claim about the Holocaust and abortion, but also on a contested claim about the state's role in enforcing the duties of a pregnant woman. 66 The German Constitutional Court refused to extend constitutional protections to pregnant women of the kind the United States Supreme
Court had extended two years earlier in its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. 62 Compare supra note 18, (Der Stern manifesto protesting the death and injury criminal abortion laws inflict on women) with supra text at note 48 (German decision providing exception to constitutional ban on abortion where doctors determine abortion is necessary to save a woman's life). 63 See supra note 18 (manifesto in Der Stern demanding "comprehensive sexual education for all and free access to contraception"). 64 See supra text at notes 45-48. 65 See id. 66 See supra text at notes 50-55 (dissenting opinion).
In what follows, I consider the competing conceptions of dignity in constitutional decisions concerning abortion in United States and Germany. As we will see, courts in each nation have reasoned about dignity differently-and differently over time. As a result, two constitutional frameworks that once seemed quite fundamentally opposed have grown in important respects to resemble one another.
Each now understands dignity as liberty and dignity as life to be implicated in the regulation of abortion; each now reasons about the dignity claims of pregnant women in ways unheard of before 1970. 
A. Competing Conceptions of Dignity in U.S. Abortion Cases

B. Competing Conceptions of Dignity in German Abortion Cases
As in the United States, constitutional law governing abortion in Germany has evolved since the 1975 decision of the Constitutional Court, and there are now striking convergences between the two systems.
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Reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 required reconciling two bodies of abortion law. 82 Prior to reunification, women in East Germany had access to abortion on demand in the first 78 Id. at 159. For the social movement roots of woman-protective antiabortion arguments, see Siegel, supra note 61. Antiabortion groups throughout the world have adopted the woman-protective argument. trimester. 83 Upon reunification, the German Federal legislature enacted the Pregnant Women's and Family Assistance Act, which decriminalized abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy, but instituted new forms of dissuasion, including a modified counseling requirement for pregnant women as well as social supports for pregnant women and mothers of young children. 84 Again, the German Constitutional Court intervened. In a 1993 decision handed down a year after Casey, the Court reaffirmed its 1975 decision requiring the that the legislature recriminalize abortion throughout pregnancy, urging "[w]herever human life exists, it should be accorded human dignity." 85 Yet the Court allowed the government to offer immunity from prosecution for abortion to women who submitted to counseling designed to persuade them to continue the pregnancy. 86 The
Court's acceptance of dissuasive counseling, rather than threat of criminal punishment, as a means of protecting life rested in part in a changed understanding of a woman's responsibility for making decisions concerning the shape of her own life. The Court recognized that laws criminalizing abortion implicated, not only dignity as life but dignity as liberty, warning however: "reference to a woman's human dignity and her ability to make responsible decisions herself does not demand that unborn life be abandoned." 87 (The dissenting justices argued that decriminalization of abortion was constitutionally permissible, given "an altered understanding of the personality and dignity of the woman." 88 ) In the wake of the 1993 decision, abortion remains criminally prohibited except under restricted indications, but a woman who completes counseling can receive a certificate granting her immunity from prosecution for an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. 89 Counseling is designed expressly to persuade a woman to continue the pregnancy and to counter any pressure from third parties who might be pushing her to end the pregnancy. 90 In this new compromise framework, the state pays for "the overwhelming majority of abortions," and Catholic lay groups are involved in counseling, and where necessary, issuing abortion certificates and providing the sex education required by law, although this has been the subject of much and extended controversy.
91
As the contest over dignity in the American and German cases illustrates, the abortion conflict is not a "zero sum game" in which only one interest can prevail. The case law vindicates competing dignity interests. Today, German constitutional law requires government to provide dissuasive counseling as a condition for allowing women access to abortion, while U.S. constitutional law permits state governments to require dissuasive counseling as a condition for allowing women access to abortion-symbolic regimes understood to vindicate both the dignity of women and of the unborn.
92
Despite the dramatically different foundational premises of the two constitutional systems, today the 89 See STRAFGESETZBUCH [CRIMINAL CODE] Nov. 13, 1998 (Ger.), 218a available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StGB_000P218. ]; Case, supra note 48, at 98. 90 Abortion II, at para. 303. The court also required the government to keep statistics on abortion, on the theory that the regime of counseling was only constitutionally permissible if it reduced the number of abortions more effectively than criminalization had. Id. 91 Id. at paras. 103, 106. See Case, supra note 48, at 100 (noting the "paradoxical" nature of this scheme). 92 The U.S. framework gives expression to federalism, allowing states to regulate abortion within the constitutional framework Casey sets forth.
German framework, in which abortion remains criminalized, functions to provide greater access to abortion in many parts of Germany than in the United States.
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IV. Dignity, Sexuality, and Life
Why have constitutional courts allowed or imposed restrictions on women's access to abortion, given the dignity claims about abortion that women have been asserting over the last several decades?
On the familiar account, courts are responding to the belief held by many citizens that abortion involves taking at least a potential human life. On this view, objections to abortion, even if rooted in religious belief, embody concerns about the unborn that are fully consistent with liberalism's harm principle-not illiberal views about women's roles or the proper ends of sexual expression. On this view, constitutional law incorporating these views would grant women dignity and self-determination in matters of sex and motherhood, but for the harm done to the dignity interests of another: the fetus.
Given accidents of physiology, in matters of abortion, dignity as life "trumps" dignity as autonomy. 93 Regional variations in access in the United States and Germany greatly complicate cross-country comparisons. In
Germany today, access to abortion during the trimester of pregnancy is described as "relatively simple," involving counseling and a short waiting period. In what follows, I demonstrate that this common account ignores claims about human dignity frequently asserted by opponents of abortion, because it misreads certain religious claims about dignity as if they were secular claims about dignity-as if the wrong of abortion could be wholly grasped through the harm principle. For many conservatives, the wrong of abortion involves more killing; it also concerns sex. Both are implicated in conservative claims about respecting the dignity of human life.
I draw this account of dignity's sex from the Catholic Church, which led opposition to abortion's decriminalization in the United States and Germany, and today works actively to oppose abortion transnationally. 94 But as I show, the view that respect for the dignity of life requires limits on sex as well as killing is held by many religious denominations.
In Catholic doctrine, respecting the dignity of human life entails restrictions on extramarital and nonprocreative sex. In the words of the Catholic catechism: "Fornication is carnal union between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman. It is gravely contrary to the dignity of persons and of human sexuality which is naturally ordered to the good of spouses and the generation and education of Vitae] In the 1968 encyclical, Pope Paul IV explained "the direct interruption of the generative process already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even for therapeutic reasons, are to be absolutely excluded as lawful means of regulating the number of children." See id. at para 20 (observing that "this endurance enhances man's dignity and confers benefits on human society"). In transforming culture so that it supports life, women occupy a place, in thought and action, which is unique and decisive. It depends on them to promote a "new feminism" which rejects the temptation of imitating models of "male domination", in order to acknowledge and affirm the true genius of women in every aspect of the life of society, and overcome all discrimination, violence and exploitation.
emerging global alliance "between conservative Christians, Muslims, and, to a lesser extent, Jews," working internationally to defend and support the "natural family." 105 One of the key actors in the global "natural family" movement is the Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society, the headquarters of the World Congress of Families, which connects Christian groups around the world, and has promulgated a natural family manifesto that numerous conservative religious groups have endorsed. 106 Vocal in its absolute opposition to abortion and homosexuality, the Center declares that all "Policy should respect the inherent dignity of human life."
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V. Dignity Claims in Cases Concerning the Rights of Gays and Lesbians
A brief consideration of claims on dignity in the gay rights context demonstrates that common concerns link the abortion and gay rights debates, despite manifest differences between them.
In the United States and Commonwealth countries there is a growing body of judicial decisions restricting government's power to criminalize sodomy and recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry that appeal to dignity as liberty and to dignity as equality in terms that are conceptually consistent with appeals to dignity in the abortion cases we have examined. In this emergent line of U.S. Appeals to dignity as life in the abortion cases are commonly construed as expressing concerns about killing, not sex; if this were so there would be no analogous claim on dignity in the marriage cases, which all agree involve no killing. But there is a conservative rejoinder to marriage claims that appeals to dignity as life. Once again, I locate the genesis of the dignity as life objection to same-sex marriage in Catholic doctrine, but note that these arguments are taken up by the broader "natural family" movement.
An advisory entitled Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions
Between Homosexual Persons, issued by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, when he was Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, undertakes to provide arguments drawn from reason which could be used by Bishops in preparing more specific interventions, appropriate to the different situations throughout the world, aimed at protecting and promoting the dignity of marriage, the foundation of the family, and the stability of society, of which this institution is a constitutive element. The present Considerations are also intended to give direction to Catholic politicians by indicating the approaches to proposed legislation in this area which would be consistent with Christian conscience.
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Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between
Homosexual Persons confirms that marriage between persons of the same sex can never fulfill the procreative, society-building ends of heterosexual marriage:
Homosexual unions are totally lacking in the biological and anthropological elements of marriage and family which would be the basis, on the level of reason, for granting them legal recognition. Such unions are not able to contribute in a proper way to the procreation and survival of the human race. The possibility of using recently discovered methods of artificial reproduction, beyond involving a grave lack of respect for human dignity, does nothing to alter this inadequacy.
and promoting as innocent -and even "liberating" -forms of sexual conduct that were traditionally regarded in the West and many other places as beneath the dignity of human beings as free and rational creatures." 123 (By contrast, members of DignityUSA, the nation's oldest association of Catholics organized to promote the rights gays and lesbians, celebrated New York's decision to recognize samesex marriage, announcing "We rejoice in this tremendous victory for equality, justice, and human dignity." 124 )
VI. Conclusion
The competing claims on dignity that we have been examining are part of a contest over social ordering that is of transnational dimensions.
In both the abortion and gay rights contexts, those who invoke dignity in support of claims of sexual freedom assert that (1) sexual expression can be separated from procreation and parenting and can be coordinated with parenting, according to an individual's decision-and that (2) that these acts of self-fashioning and relationship building are worthy of social respect. The dignity-based claims for abortion rights and marriage equality seek more than tolerance, privacy, or freedom from social control; they seek social recognition of relationships that resist traditional norms and roles enforced by family and the church. In both the abortion rights and gay rights contexts, those who invoke dignity to contest traditional roles are endeavoring to democratize control over sexual norms and social structure.
Their opponents invoke dignity to defend traditional sexual roles. They understand human dignity as realized through discipline and conformity with customary sexual roles rather than through freedom and self-fashioning, and so interpret acts in defiance of traditional sexual roles as violating human dignity.
This conflict over dignity's sex has run on for decades, across borders, and is now spilling from abortion rights to gay rights. It offers a fascinating window on processes through which dignity has acquired meaning and authority in human rights contests.
Claims on dignity in cases concerning the regulation of sexuality exhibit forms of conceptual consistency, not only within, but across constitutional orders. 
